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Dillard, Philip D. Jefferson Davis’s Final Campaign: Confederate Nationalism
and the Fight to Arm Slaves. Mercer University Press, $35.00 ISBN 881466050
Re-Evaluating Confederate Emancipation
Phillip Dillard attempts to provide a deeper examination of the Confederate
debate to arm slaves than historians have done before. First seriously mooted by
Irish immigrant General Pat Cleburne, after the debacle of the Confederate loss
at Chattanooga in late 1863, realistic proposals only came to the fore in late 1864
as General Robert E. Lee confronted President Jefferson Davis with the reality of
severe manpower shortages in the Army of Northern Virginia. Davis, who had
ordered all discussion of Cleburne’s proposal halted less than a year before, was
now more sympathetic to the concept. In his message to Congress in late 1864,
Davis called for an examination of the potential recruitment of slaves into the
Confederate army in return for some measure of their freedom. Davis’s allies
worked in Congress to make this plan so, but it took until early March 1865
before the Confederate Congress passed an act for the recruitment of such slaves
in the Confederate army. Only small numbers were recruited though, many of
whom deserted, which meant that it was much too bitty and much too late to
have any effect on the outcome of the War. As a result, Dillard believes, other
scholars, who have studied Confederate emancipation, dismiss the radical
elements of it, believing that Davis “cynically promoted” it only as a desperate
last measure to save the Confederacy (p.4). He disagrees and believes that the
offer was real and truly revolutionary in nature especially as he promises to
concentrate his argument of the attitudes of “common southerners” (p.5) rather
than elites.
Dillard’s effort centres on Confederate newspaper opinion from late 1864 
through the end of the war. He focuses on three states, Virginia, for the eastern 
theater, Georgia, for the 1864 western theater, and Texas for the relatively 
peaceful Trans-Mississippi West. What he finds is that there were substantial
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differences between these states, as well as some change over time. In Virginia,
Dillard sees the greatest support for the arming of slaves and also in
emancipation for any who did serve. There were opponents, but these were
usually papers already critical of the Davis administration’s general war effort.
John Daniel’s Richmond Examiner, for example, an implacable opponent of
Davis, was, unsurprisingly, an opponent of the policy, even to the point of being
heavily critical of the vaunted Robert E. Lee’s support of it.
Georgia’s newspapers, even though the state had seen the fall of Atlanta and
Sherman’s march to the sea, were more evenly split and also showed the most
change over time. Regional differences within the state explained some of the
division. Athens, for example, the seat of the University of Georgia, in the
eastern part of the state, showed no support, the city being relatively untouched
directly by the war. In the central part of the state, however, which had suffered
the sting of defeat at the hands of Sherman, “the bold comments that appeared in
the Macon Telegraph and Confederate [calling for the enlistment of slaves] . . .
show that many Central Georgians would not follow the head-in-the-sand
approach” of opponents but instead “heard the howls of necessity and explored
radical solutions to the [Confederate] manpower problem” (p.136). Even some
initial critics came around to its necessity as the situation became even worse for
the Confederacy in the Spring of ’65.
Texas indicated the least support for slave enlistment. Far away from the
disasters on the battlefields to the east, most Texas editors and correspondents
felt that the need for more troops could be met by more efficient conscription of
the white population. They were also the most vociferous against any discussion
of emancipation as a reward for slave service. Anyone suggesting such an idea
was widely condemned. Judge John T. Mills, Irish-born immigrant and planter,
for example, wrote to a Galveston newspaper in January 1865 calling for
enlistment and emancipation as the only options were “submission and reunion
or emancipation and continuing the struggle” (p.157). Mills, even though he had
been an ardent secessionist in 1861, received such opposition that just six weeks
later he “broke and recanted” (p.247). Writing another public letter, he stated
that he had never “‘doubted our ability to maintain our independence without
humiliating concessions to Yankeedom, or any of the rest of mankind, on the
subject of slavery or any other’” (p. 247). In Texas it seemed that the slavery
system continued virtually unmolested as the state continued to produce cotton
(for very lucrative sale across the border in Mexico).
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Dillard rightly makes these state differences a major element of his study.
Where the slavery system could still run efficiently, it did. But, even in Virginia
where the need was most desperate, there were still many opposed beyond some
disgruntled publishers. Its two Confederate senators were opposed voting against
the measure as late as February, and only changed their minds when the Virginia
legislature (meeting in the same building in Richmond) threatened to replace
them. The final passage was a close run thing in the Senate too, and thus the act
did not enshrine emancipation as a reward for enlistment. Slavery was to be
maintained even at this late hour. Dillard wants to concentrate on the “common
southerners” opinions but ultimately it was the elite’s views that really mattered.
Only military desperation got anything passed at all.
Ultimately, it’s difficult to tell how much the newspaper editorials and/or
letters truly represented the views of these common southerners. Too often
Dillard sees support for emancipation in the papers as representing the will of the
many. For example, the Augusta Constitutionalist was a major supporter of
Confederate emancipation and published numerous letters in favor of it. Dillard
takes this as a sign that the “vast majority” of Augustans “discovered that slavery
could be sacrificed much more easily than southern independence” (p.220). His
evidence from the Constitutionalist does not justify that conclusion (along with
the fact that the other paper, the Augusta Chronicle, which, to be fair, he covers,
was a vociferous opponent). This overstatement is a pity as just highlighting the
extent of the debate in these three states is a valuable contribution to our
understanding of the issue. Dillard shows that it’s too easy to dismiss it as a
cynical ploy because it did prompt serious thinking and debate across the country
about what the Confederacy stood for as it faced defeat. Engaging more with the
historiography though would have added more nuance here and Dillard does not
do enough of that. Paul Quigley’s work on southern nationalism, for example,
sees “sacrifice” as the last defining characteristic of Confederate nationalism left
at the end of the war. Perhaps the move to use slaves then had more to do with
that example than any serious rethinking of what southern independence really
meant or any real radical change in Confederate ideology on the centrality of
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